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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This article aims to explain the process that led to 
the design, development and deployment of an 
accident analysis grid, integrating human and 
organizational dimensions. This grid is based on the 
CREAM method, developed by Hollnagel (1998). 
Specifically, the grid is based on the use of the 
concept of Common Performance Conditions (CPC; 
Hollnagel op cit.), known as screening. 
 
This grid has been deployed in the field of gas 
distribution in France. This business is distinguished 
by a high level of risk, rather prescriptive procedures 
and an approach to accident analysis that tends to 
focus on technical components. In this context, the 
introduction of CPCs reflects a desire to increase 
control of safety by broadening the spectrum of 
causes of accidents. However, beyond these 
technical aspects, CPCs bring with them a deep 
change in the accident paradigm and its aetiology. 
The technical content of the method and the changes 
it has brought about will be described in this article. 
 
The analysis grid discussed here is the result of two 
years of work and research carried out by a working 
group established by the Risk Management Centre at 
GrDF, Mines ParisTech and the Research and 
Innovation Department of the GDF-SUEZ group. 
1.1 GrDF in brief 
GrDF was created on 31st December, 2007. As a 
100% subsidiary of GDF-SUEZ, it manages all ac-
tivities related to natural gas distribution in France. 
With nearly 46,000 employees and 190,000 km of 
network, it serves 11 million customers. 
 
A business like this is affected by many safety 
issues. Two main areas of activity can lead to 
accidents involving gas facilities: 
 
• Supervision of the network provided by 
GrDF. This is the responsibility of the operations 
manager who manages all access to the network 
needed for maintenance. The teams involved may 
either belong to GrDF or be external contractors. 
• Public works carried out by external 
contractors. Work may be done under the 
supervision of GrDF or be conducted in a context 
totally separate from GrDF. Companies working 
close to GrDF facilities must apply for plans of 
the layout of the network. 
1.2 Accidents and the need for learning from 
experience 
Structural damage such as a leak from a pipe cut by 
a mechanical digger can have very different 
consequences. The most benign only affect the 
physical aspects of the structure, where costs are 
relatively low. The expenditure required to repair a 
pipe supplying a building, including repair and travel 
costs, does not exceed a few hundred euros. 
However, the most serious incidents can lead to huge 
material losses and deaths, especially in the case of 
fire and explosion. 
 
With such high material and human stakes, learning 
from past events is essential to ensure distribution 
safety. For GrDF, this training is even more 
important because the environment that the company 
is working in is exposed to numerous threats. 
External contractors work on the network and the 
dangers of natural gas are factors which make safety 
management even more difficult. It is hoped that the 
CPC-centred accident analysis grid presented in this 
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For GrDF and industry in general, learning from 
experience often takes the form of training. Training 
is defined by Rakoto (2004) as a “structured 
approach to the capitalization and operationalization 
of information resulting from the analysis of positive 
and/or negative events. It implements a set of human 
and technological resources that must be managed to 
reduce the repetition of errors and promote good 
practice”. 
 
In structural terms, the learning from experience 
process can be divided into four phases (Van Was-
senhove & Garbolino, 2008): 
 
• detection of the problem, information gathering; 
• analysis; 
• formalization of knowledge and capitalization; 
• sharing and reuse of knowledge. 
 
This article will focus on the analysis phase. 
2 CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROTOTYPE AND 
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANALYSIS GRID 
 
Several stakeholders were involved in this project. 
First, professionals at the Risk Management Centre 
(GrDF) brought their knowledge of site management 
and operating procedures at locations where work is 
carried out; Mines ParisTech researchers contributed 
their knowledge of the method. Finally, the Research 
Department of GDF-SUEZ brought technical 
support in the creation of the initial analysis grids 
and participated in benchmarking at on-site 
locations. 
 
Concretely, the design and development of the 
analysis grid followed three phases: 
 
1. Development of a prototype. The major part of 
this phase was to adjust the terms of the original 
CPCs to the business of distributing gas. This 
was achieved by bringing together business and 
operational experts. The grid was implemented 
in a spreadsheet to facilitate its development 
among stakeholders, and to simplify its dissemi-
nation to pilot sites. Details of this phase can be 
found in Besnard et al. (2009). 
2. Testing at pilot sites. This phase involved testing 
in real-life conditions and the collection of user 
feedback. Tests were conducted between March 
and April 2009 on operational sites in the Paris 
region. Each test provided an opportunity to ap-
ply the grid to an active situation, and to receive 
feedback and feature requests.  
3. Final development and deployment. The final 
phase was to assimilate the feedback from pilot 
sites and produce a final version of the analysis 
grid. Regional managers were trained, and in 
turn, trained managers in their area of responsi-
bility. At the end of the first half of 2009 and six 
months after the start of prototyping, all opera-
tional sites had been trained. At this stage, the 
method was deployed nationally in GrDF’s 
eighteen network units. Integration with informa-
tion systems took place the following year. 
 
During the development process, the CPCs were 
adapted to GrDF working practices and professional 
vocabulary. In addition, sub-criteria were introduced 
to match the business jargon (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Performance conditions and sub-criteria of the 
screening grid 
 
Performance 
Condition 
Sub-criteria 
Working conditions Working environment 
Personal protection equipment 
Temperature, noise, light 
Materials and tools Use of a tool appropriate to the task 
Condition of tools and vehicles 
Storage and availability 
IT equipment 
Rules and procedures Description of tasks according to 
procedures, and relevance of 
procedures.  
Deployment and availability 
Compliance with procedures 
Mapping and designa-
tion 
Availability of maps to GrDF field 
operators 
Maps correspond to the terrain 
Underground maps corresponds to 
the terrain 
Consistent mapping 
Designation of facilities 
Workload  Actors undertake more than one 
activity at a time 
Rhythm of work 
Time management Preparation 
Execution 
Breakpoints to assess the situation 
Professionalism Knowledge 
Know-how 
Skills 
Collaboration Sub-contractors respect contract 
terms 
Working agreements with fire 
services are followed 
Team-working 
Shared means and objectives 
Collaboration and respect for team 
roles  
Distribution of skills 
Communication Business language 
Communication methods 
Traceable/adequate internal 
information 
Impact of external information on 
event management 
Technical manage-
ment 
Decision-making chain 
Management of gas flow 
Condition, accessibility and 
maintenance of site 
Design/operation of sites 
3 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS USING THE 
SCREENING GRID 
3.1 The spirit of the method 
The difficulty of accurately quantifying a base 
probability for human error is a major problem for 
methods such as THERP (Swain, 1964). This 
difficulty has led to a new generation of methods for 
human reliability analysis which try to circumvent 
the problem. These methods no longer consider it 
possible to reduce human error to a basic probability 
modulated by the context. Instead the context is seen 
as the factor that influences performance the most. 
Performance is then defined through concepts such 
as Performance Shaping Factors, introduced by 
Swain & Guttman (1984) or the Common 
Performance Conditions (CPC) of Hollnagel (1998). 
These concepts see failure as the effect of the 
context in which the operator performs an action. 
 
This vision is a radical change in the modelling of 
human failure: the context determines the perform-
ance of the operator. This view of performance is a 
significant advance because it allows us to rethink 
the concept of human error. The allocation of re-
sponsibility bias described by Reason (1997) can be 
avoided. If the analysis focuses on the conditions, ra-
ther than behaviour, the operator's performance is 
viewed in the context in which they acted, and in the 
light of the information available to them. In other 
words, if there is an upstream failure in the organiza-
tion, human error is not the cause but the conse-
quence of unfavourable performance conditions. 
3.2 The conduct of an analysis 
Depending on the nature of the event, an accident 
may be flagged by operators. An accident investiga-
tion can then begin.  
 
There are four stages. 
 
• The gathering of information. This includes all 
the administrative, technical and factual data on 
the event. It establishes the initial context and the 
stakeholders involved in the analysis. 
• The safety debriefing. This involves the field 
manager and any operators concerned. An essen-
tial action is the preparation of an event sum-
mary. Without this, the analysis cannot continue. 
This summary provides the manager with the 
material to decide to whether to hold a further 
analysis of the accident, depending on the impact 
of the event. It helps to identify areas which the 
investigation will focus on.  
• The analysis. This is optional and is carried out 
on the order of the field manager. Once initiated, 
it must satisfy the requirement of bringing to-
gether the various internal or external protago-
nists. Its aim is to trace the root causes of the 
event and identify the aggravating factors that led 
to deterioration in the situation. The spirit of the 
analysis must be to seek the contextual factors 
that had an impact on operations in order to un-
derstand the origin of possible errors without 
seeking to blame someone. This is the stage 
where the CPC-based grid is used. 
• The synthesis. This brings together all the mate-
rial gathered from the debriefing and the analy-
sis. From this, a preventive and corrective action 
plan can be defined.  
 
Beyond the technical contents of the analysis grid, 
the adoption of a new tool and paradigm triggered 
side-effects ranging from the resources involved to 
new managerial and organisational challenges. Be-
cause these changes impact safety one way or an-
other, it is worth considering them. That is what the 
next section is about. 
4 INITIAL LESSONS FOLLOWING 
DEPLOYMENT 
The introduction of the analysis grid took place in a 
context of profound organizational change. The 
paradigm shift in accident analysis required 
managers to master a new mind-set, and 
impediments to the assimilation of the method 
proved to be internal (Gaillard, 2008). These 
impediments showed themselves at three points in 
time: in the design of the tool, in its implementation 
and in its use. Design and implementation of the grid 
did not cause major problems. However, the use 
phase was enlightening. 
4.1 Limitations noted in the use of the grid 
Four limitations were identified when using the grid 
in operational conditions: 
 
• Research responsibilities. At the beginning of de-
ployment, not many of the analyses produced 
were useful. This was due to a lack of under-
standing of the concept of ‘performance condi-
tions’. The latter were interpreted as the criteria 
for dependability. This misunderstanding ob-
scured the analysis in favour of the allocation of 
responsibilities. 
• Cost analysis. Managers have seen the introduc-
tion of a screening grid as an addition to their 
workload, and known to be incompatible with 
the many planned interventions in the field. 
• Cost of data compilation. The increased complex-
ity of analysis has increased the amount of in-
formation that can be collected and analysed. 
The cost of exploiting this information has in-
creased. It now requires managers to spend time 
formatting the results before they are able to dis-
seminate the assessment. This additional work-
load diminished interest in the grid and did not 
provide timely information for operators. A 
computer application has partially overcome this 
problem. 
• Lack of support from senior management. A 
fourth point was the feeling that industrial safety 
managers were not supportive. Despite the assis-
tance given at the pilot sites (and all other sites), 
through additional training and on-request meth-
odological help, a feeling of isolation was noted. 
In particular, the feeling was that managers did 
not take into account the increased costs associ-
ated with accident analysis. 
4.2 Contributions of the method 
In the two-year period during which the analysis 
grid has been implemented, several points have 
emerged which show that the changes that ensued 
had an effect on working practices. 
 
• Unification of analysis practices. The screening 
grid was an alternative to the heterogeneity of 
practices that existed at the time. Today, the grid 
supports the convergence of safety information. 
The introduction of a simple grid helped sys-
tematize the collection and analysis of data. 
• The fault tree is used less. Historically, this 
method was widely used in the business, includ-
ing for the analysis of operator actions. The in-
troduction of the screening grid goes beyond the 
concept of error and the search for logical com-
binations resulting in failure, to instead focus on 
the work of operators. 
• Unification of operating data. It became possible 
to exploit operational information related to 
safety that was previously available only in a 
piecemeal way. Following analysis of a hundred 
accidents, the weakest points in the network 
were identified. They involve mostly the main 
network connections, which total more than 80% 
of facilities affected by accidents. In over 80% of 
these cases, the cause of the accident is identified 
as a lack of knowledge of the network on the part 
of the external contractor, due in part to the lack 
of identification of installations. 
• Perceived usefulness for safety. CPCs have been 
seen as a way to conduct an in-depth analysis 
useful for safety. By using the screening version 
of CREAM rather than the full method, the 
analysis grid also served as an entry guide to us-
ers in their understanding of the concept of ‘per-
formance conditions’. 
• Integration of safety management. Another posi-
tive point was the development of information 
exchanges and discussions. Transparency was 
enhanced and mutual understanding between the 
various operating sites of local conditions in-
creased. A non-technical aspect of the analysis 
grid is that it serves as a medium of exchange 
and dialogue between operators, and national and 
local managers responsible for risk management. 
This point supports the development of an inte-
grated safety culture as described by Groeneweg 
et al. (2002). In turn, a larger role is given to ex-
change and understanding of the causes of errors. 
Also, the progressive revision of the role of sanc-
tions maintains an active upward flow of infor-
mation to safety managers at national level. 
5 DISCUSSION 
The introduction of the analysis grid represents a 
paradigm change in the practice of accident analysis, 
which has seen a significant evolution. However, the 
demonstration of improved safety management does 
not come easily. On the one hand, compromises 
have emerged between the cost of using the new grid 
and available resources. On the other, there are inter-
esting side effects. These two phenomena will be 
discussed in this section. 
5.1 Operational difficulties and trade-offs 
Several potential difficulties for operators and 
managers were identified during the deployment of 
the analysis grid. For example, the grid was new and 
the analysis took longer. These difficulties affected 
the quality of accident investigation and, 
consequently, the ability of the company to have an 
overview of the causes of accidents. 
 
The introduction of the grid and the difficulties it 
caused were not accompanied by new resources. 
With the same amount of resources, new problems 
trigger trade-offs (Simon, 1955). It is therefore 
possible that the screening grid, designed to increase 
safety management levels, in fact contributed to their 
degradation. To understand how safety could be 
affected, it became important to identify the trade-
offs created in accident analysis.  
 
• Trade-off between depth of analysis and usabil-
ity of the grid. Because of the newness of the 
analysis grid, operators and local managers had 
little experience with its content and use. This 
problem can be the cause of a loss of analytical 
depth as they tried to avoid the difficulties intro-
duced by the new approach to analysis. These 
avoidance strategies and their negative conse-
quences on the desired objectives (more safety) 
have already been found in other areas (Besnard 
& Arief, 2004). 
• Trade-off between depth of analysis and work-
load. Accident analysis teams are the same peo-
ple responsible for network interventions. The 
time spent on analysis with the grid (rather than 
the traditional debriefing without support) is 
therefore at the expense of interventions. This 
poses a risk of loss of depth in the analysis of an 
accident or concentration on major accidents in 
order to save resources for network operations. 
• Trade-off between criticality and workload. 
This trade-off is related to the previous one. The 
perceived notion of criticality can mediate the se-
lection of events to be analysed and the time 
available. The safety risk lies in the underestima-
tion of the criticality of an accident and the im-
plicit revision of the notion of an incident. 
• Trade-off between performance management 
and operations management. Organizational 
changes related to the redefinition of job descrip-
tions for those responsible for the analysis were 
also identified. As a result, the introduction of 
the analysis grid means local managers must now 
manage a double-bind: they must meet the per-
formance requirements of senior managers and 
deal with complaints from emergency teams who 
see changes in their job. 
5.2 Secondary effects of shift in the analysis 
paradigm 
The paradigm of performance conditions solves the 
paradox of learning from experience. Limiting 
analysis to only unwanted events poses a 
fundamental problem for safety: a decline in the 
number of accidents and incidents gradually deprives 
the organization of incoming data to drive safety. In 
other words, using a learning process based on 
unwanted events, the effectiveness of the safety 
management system can only be assessed if 
accidents occur. Otherwise, how do you know if the 
safety barriers are working? While senior 
management considers safety as a top priority, the 
accident, and loss of control it represents is still, 
paradoxically, the only means available to determine 
if the system was safe. 
 
This negative view of safety, that is only intended to 
limit the consequences of unwanted events, neglects 
positive performance. Instead, safety is seen as the 
result of compliance with procedures and use of 
suitable tools. In this vision, everyday actions that 
guarantee the absence of unwanted events are not 
taken into account. In the same way, both the 
purpose of the activities carried out by operators, and 
how they mentally represent them are disregarded. 
Finally, this negative vision of safety overlooks the 
importance of the organizational context in industrial 
processes (Davoudian et al., 1994). 
 
The error attribution bias described by Reason 
(1997) is a consequence of this reasoning. It sees an 
accident as the result of a lack of knowledge or a 
lack of discipline in applying tools and procedures. 
The analysis grid helped to foster exchanges to avoid 
this bias. It also allowed the company to focus on the 
conditions surrounding the occurrence of accidents, 
not just the actions of operators. 
 
The decision to integrate the paradigm of 
performance conditions into safety management had 
an impact beyond the scope of accident analysis. 
Training of local managers was one of the areas 
affected. Conventional training courses, oriented 
towards obtaining theoretical and practical skills 
have been revised. This is now complemented by the 
design and development of an operation’s office 
simulator in which the operational scenarios are 
created from the analysis of accident records. 
 
Learning from experience in general, and the 
analysis grid described here, is much more than a 
tool for the exploitation of incidental knowledge in a 
socio-technical system. Indeed, it goes beyond the 
sphere of safety by creating opportunities for 
exchange, collaboration and new practices. On this 
last point, learning from experience is a real tool for 
the creation or strengthening of safety culture. Safety 
is no longer seen as the result of the application of 
procedures or monitoring of indicators, but rather as 
the result of a collective effort. 
6 LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSION 
The first lesson to be drawn from the deployment of 
a new accident analysis tool is that its design and 
deployment is not only a technical change. Such a 
belief on the part of management is counter-
productive. The introduction of a new tool or a new 
technique only produces the desired results if it is 
understood and accepted by end users. ‘Participatory 
prototyping’ is instrumental in this respect. 
 
The choice of such a development method requires 
significant support. The participatory aspect of co-
development must extend beyond design, in order to 
avoid local strategies being deployed that attempt to 
circumvent or modify the tool. Ultimately, the risk of 
such a situation is the disruption of information flow 
back to senior management. Should this happen, 
safety decisions would no longer fit the reality on the 
ground. To avoid this happening, senior managers in 
charge of the learning from experience process must 
be prepared to guarantee communication and long-
term training. 
 
A final aspect of the introduction of performance 
conditions is disruption of management practices. 
The concepts of blame and punishment become 
more difficult to maintain in the corporate culture. 
There is an acute generational problem as operators 
with considerable seniority in the company have 
worked with these concepts throughout their career. 
The management of technical change therefore goes 
hand-in-hand with social and demographic variables. 
This must be addressed to provide the analysis grid 
with a sustainable anchor in company culture. 
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